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THE INTERNATIONALITY OF
ECONOMIC INTERESTS *
CORWIN D. EDWARDS tf
Every private enterprise country recognizes that private business
may be operated in ways that are contrary to the public interest and
therefore tries to curb such operations by use of governmental power.
Every such country recognizes that business enterprises may engage in
disputes among themselves or with other economic entities, and that
these disputes may require public intervention and settlement. Every
such country depends for its revenues partly upon the taxation of
business activities, intangible as well as tangible business assets, or
business income or profits. The controls and taxation which are im-
posed upon business do not raise problems of national jurisdiction as
long as the assets, activities, revenues, and effects of business enterprise
lie entirely within a single country. An economic society consisting of
quasi-subsistence agriculture, local handicraft, and local trade to trans-
fer the products of handicraft and agriculture between towns and
countryside would seldom produce problems of control or taxation
cutting across national boundaries; a simple territorial basis for govern-
ment jurisdiction would be sufficient for any economic problem.
In its origins, Western society sufficiently resembled this
mode' to have given a strong territorial bias to our concepts of juris-
diction over economic affairs.
Nevertheless, the rise of trade soon made it evident that the
economic interests of a nation did not stop at the territorial boundaries.
Every trading country became interested in the well-being and business
opportunity of its traders abroad, in revenue from its exports, and in
access to foreign supplies of goods. Countries with sufficient power
took steps to safeguard these interests. Access to foreign resources
and opportunity to sell in foreign markets became major stakes of
diplomacy and, when diplomacy failed, major reasons for war. Old-
style imperialism sought to secure preferential trade positions by impos-
ing governments on weak peoples or by converting indigenous govern-
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ments into puppets. History dramatically illustrates that nations' vital
concerns reach beyond their frontiers and that nations will reach be-
yond their borders to protect these interests.
Pursuit of such extraterritorial policies frequently brought govern-
ments into conflict. Major differences were settled by war; where in-
terests were too small to justify war, restriction was met by retaliatory
restriction, and many significant national interests were impaired.
I. LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Nobody found this situation satisfactory. At least partly in the
hope that trading interests might be better protected and national con-
flicts might be better avoided, the liberal theory of international trade-
that every country should allow free export and import of goods and
capital and free movement of people across national boundaries-
evolved. To the extent that this pattern could be realized, it was
thought to eliminate the economic importance of the national frontier.
It seemed to restore consistency between national territorial jurisdic-
tion and national concern over foreign trade, and to offer the prospect
that peace would not be impaired by efforts to extend national au-
thority in support of the national interest.
Belief that a liberal trade policy was a nostrum for international
economic problems was plausible, however, only on certain assump-
tions. One was that governmental restrictions were the sole source of
action from abroad that could significantly damage a nation's economic
interests. As international trade became more tightly organized by
large corporations and cartels, this assumption became implausible. As
in the cases of quinine, potash, and watches, a national cartel in a
country supplying most of an export commodity could sometimes im-
pose its will on foreign users of the product, while the government of
the exporting country either gave assistance or stood benevolently
aside. An international cartel comprised of producers in all major ex-
porting countries could exercise a controlling power exceeding that
of the government of any one of the participating countries. Private
trade restriction could have results similar to those of public trade
restriction.
Thus liberalization of government trade policy came to require, as
a corollary, curbs upon cartels that affected international trade. The
necessity of this dual policy was recognized in the draft charter of the
defunct International Trade Organization,' and is currently taken for
1 Compare U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization, arts. 17-20 (E/Conf. 2/78) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 1948.II.D.4) (1948), with id., arts. 46-54.
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granted in the European Economic Community.' We are well on the
way to formal acceptance of the point that each country has a legitimate
interest in private restrictions imposed upon its trade or its markets
from abroad.
Broad claims of jurisdiction are inherent in any effort to cope
with international cartels by unilateral governmental action. The
cartel contract is international. Producing countries are unlikely to
try to control or destroy it; and if any of them attempts to do so, it
cannot succeed unless companies under its control furnish a significant
part of the total supply. Consuming countries cannot protect their
citizens from the cartel unless they can apply a control based on the
effect of the restrictions upon their domestic market rather than on the
physical location of plants, the place of execution of the agreement, or
the residence of the contracting parties.8 Often a consuming country
cannot reach such a cartel because it cannot find property or persons
over which to exercise its authority; but where the available instru-
ments of control will reach they are likely to be used. Governments
which have stood ready to protect their trade interests by measures
such as war and seizure of territory can scarcely be expected to refrain
from asserting the authority to do so by the peaceful use of their ad-
ministrative and judicial systems. In the absence of efforts by pro-
ducing countries or by intergovernmental organizations to afford
them protection, they are not likely to be deterred by the assertions
of producing countries that such self-protection is improper.
II. INTERNATIONAL USE OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Belief in the sufficiency of a liberal trade policy rested also upon
concepts of nationality appropriate to a world of personal enterprise.
A major modern source of difficulty as to conflict of jurisdiction has
been the internationalization of enterprises, made possible by the
anonymity, ambiguity, and fluidity of corporate structure. Under
the corporate system it is possible to conceal the identity of the persons
who own or effectively control a corporation and the de facto national
allegiance of those persons. A single interest may be expressed in a
series of corporate entities, each having not only a separate legal per-
sonality but also a separate corporate nationality. Two or more in-
terests may be affiliated through interlaced stock ownership without
public disclosure of the alliance. It is possible for an enterprise to
change the number of its corporate personalities, their nationalities, the
2 See Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, pt. 1, arts. 2-3, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1,
arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 15-16, 47-48.
3 See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 32,
comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958); cf. 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 439, 543-61 (Supp.
1935).
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nature of their affiliation with one another, and the locus of nominal
control without any changes in the underlying physical operations or
actual control. There is no longer any predictable concomitance
between the corporation as a legal entity and as identifiable commercial
operation, with identifiable ownership and management. Nor is there
any longer a predictable concomitance between corporate nationality
and the nationality appropriate to the locus of commercial operations,
the locus of actual control over those operations, the nationality of the
individuals who exercise that control, or the nationality of the bene-
ficial owners. The ability of businessmen to manipulate legal fictions
has made obsolete the presumptions that are still expressed in much of
our thinking-presumptions that a business enterprise has boundaries
identical with those of a corporation, that the enterprise has a single
national identity, and that this identity can be reliably inferred from
the country in which it is incorporated.
People, like corporations, can change their nationality. But when
a man does so, he loses his previous nationality and acquires the new
one only on evidence that he has identified his interest with the new
country by residence, service in its armed forces, or in some similar
way. A business, however, can acquire a new nationality much as
a woman acquires a new dress-by the acquisition of a new corporate
identity in addition to its old one.
The arbitrary nature of corporate nationality and its irrelevance to
the underlying economic facts is evident in numerous cases, of which
one illustration will suffice. Petroleum operations in Iraq were car-
ried on between the two World Wars by a British corporation which
was the legal expression of an international agreement among Dutch,
French, American, and British corporate interests. To escape British
income tax, the joint subsidiary operated under a non-profit working
agreement, and the necessary papers were executed in Belgium. One
of the beneficial owners of the subsidiary was a naturalized British sub-
ject resident in London. He had never been in Canada, but he set up
a Canadian corporation to own his shares and receive his part of the
profits.
So anonymous is corporate control that when efforts are made to
pierce the corporate veil in time of war, the facts are often matters of
dispute. Whether control of General Aniline, an American corpora-
tion, was properly to be regarded as German or Swiss, became a matter
for enduring controversy in American courts.4 So far is a corporation
4 See Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953),
modified sub noin. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
rev'd sub nor. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) for a description
of the corporate complexity of General Aniline.
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from necessarily expressing any national economic interest that anti-
trust investigations have not infrequently uncovered instances in which
the function assigned to a national subsidiary of a foreign corporation
by the parent was to retard the development of production within the
country of its incorporation and thus assure the more profitable ex-
ploitation of foreign productive facilities.
These characteristics of international corporate enterprises have
tended to deprive all governments of effective control of their activities.
A corporation chartered by one country may be managed by citizens
of another while controlled by a company in a third country; it may
sell products in a fourth country which were produced in a fifth, and
may compete with enterprises engaged in production in yet another
country. No nation has exclusive jurisdiction over such an enterprise.
The segments of authority actually exercised probably do not corre-
spond to the extent of the national interest in the corporation's activi-
ties. Rather, they are likely to reflect inherited traditions of jurisdic-
tion that were not developed to cope with the phenomena of corporate
structure.
Even the formal corporate structure often consists of a chain of
subsidiaries chartered in several countries. Since the corporate com-
bine can usually accomplish its purposes by action through more than
one of the entities of which it is composed, any single country trying
to control such a multinational corporation is likely to find that control
cannot be effective unless it reaches upstream to a parent company or
downstream to one or more of the subsidiaries. Otherwise a company
forbidden to make a particular agreement may, in fact, enjoy the bene-
fits of an agreement of the same substance made abroad on its behalf by
a foreign parent or subsidiary; incriminating documents may be re-
moved from the home office and lodged abroad in the offices of another
member of the combine; and when required to remove the effects of
an unlawful restriction of export trade by licensing its patented tech-
nology to a competitor, a company may nullify the effect of the license
by inducing a foreign affiliate to sue the exporter under counterpart
patents held overseas. In undertaking control upstream or down-
stream, the country doing so often finds it necessary to control action
that is also subject to the authority of other governments. The choice
is likely to lie between a broad claim of jurisdiction and impotence.
Private rights as well as public authority are difficult to vindicate
when these possibilities of corporate blind-man's buff exist. Several
years ago one American company sued another, charging that the
second company was unlawfully trying to exclude it from the Canadian
market. The plaintiff sought to examine certain documents possessed
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by the defendant which would prove the truth or falsity of the claim.
To escape this examination, the defendant sent these documents abroad,
first to a subsidiary in London, and later, when their location was dis-
covered, to Switzerland. Had the American court viewed its juris-
diction as being limited by the national boundaries, the maneuver
would have been successful. But since corporate control over the
documents was exercised from the United States, judicial control was
similarly exercised. The court ordered the defendant to bring the
documents back to London and make them available there for inspec-
tion.5 After this the defendant company settled the suit and removed
the obstacles which it had set up to sale in Canada.
Broad claims of jurisdiction are inevitable in efforts to control
international enterprise. A government that can reach only part of
the corporate structure is easily thwarted unless it can obtain informa-
tion about other parts of the structure and can prevent them from
taking action to defeat its policies. If power to do this cannot be
exercised, there will be cases in which none of the affected govern-
ments can apply effective control.
The obstacles that deflect control of international enterprises vary
from country to country because of variations in the degree to which
governments seek to defend their corporations against jurisdictional
claims of other governments and in the leeway that national laws give
corporations as to secrecy about their ownership, holdings, and opera-
tions. A kind of Gresham's law of government control operates inter-
nationally, by which corporations cluster under the shelter of those
governments that are most lenient or will defend them most aggres-
sively. Escape from taxes by manipulating corporate nationality and
the locus of legal action has become so apparent that students of taxa-
tion refer to certain countries as tax havens. Efforts to escape from
antitrust laws are similarly evident in antitrust practice in the United
States. Doubtless similar efforts will become apparent elsewhere as
other countries apply effective legislation to control restrictive practices.
Even today, one could accurately refer to one or two countries as
control havens.
5 The ruling referred to arose in the course of litigation involving Radio Corpo-
ration of America, Rauland Corporation, and Zenith Radio Corporation, which dragged
on in the federal courts in Chicago, Illinois and Wilmington, Delaware for several
years. Many rulings on issues of discovery, including the one mentioned, are un-
reported. For further information on the international discovery aspects of this case,
see RCA v. Rauland Corp., 21 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (motion to suppress taking
depositions in Norway denied); RCA v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Ill.
1955) ; RCA v. Rauland Corp., 16 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. IlL. 1954) ; Zenith Radio Corp.
v. RCA, 101 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952).
[Vol.ll1:183
1962] INTERNATIONALITY OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS 189
III. PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Theories as to a nation's jurisdiction over trade seem to a layman
like myself to involve three conflicting principles.
6 According to the
first principle, jurisdiction is territorial-persons and acts within a
country can be controlled by the government; persons and acts beyond
the boundary are exempt. According to the second principle, juris-
diction is personal-citizens are subject to control wherever they may
be, and persons domiciled within the country may be treated like citi-
zens; but the foreigner overseas is exempt. According to the third
principle, jurisdiction depends upon the location of the effect of the
conduct which is sought to be controlled. What affects domestic
trade is subject to control, including acts abroad by foreigners.
Both the second and the third principle are inconsistent with the
first. To reach into another country to'control one's own citizens is
no less an invasion of territorial jurisdiction than to reach into it to
control an impairment of trade in one's own market.
In practice, most governments invoke different theories of juris-
diction in different settings. Joint use of the first and second principles
is common; use of the third principle is more common than is some-
times asserted. I question whether any government consistently limits
itself to a single one of these theories in all matters, civil and criminal,
under both public and private law.
7
Substantial diversity of principle is apparent in the scope of na-
tional laws concerned wit restrictive trade arrangements. These laws
assert jurisdiction, not only in their provisions for the termination or
correction of objectionable practices, but also in their provisions re-
quiring that restrictive arrangements and dominant firms be reported
to the government. Critics of the American antitrust laws have some-
times asserted that the United States follows a principle of extra-
territoriality, whereas other countries consistently eschew such 
a
course.s But the texts of foreign laws do not seem to support this
assertion.
Reporting requirements exist or have existed in the laws 
of nine
countries. In three of these, only enterprises that do business in 
the
6 International law recognizes at least five bases of jurisdiction. See 29 Am. 
J.
INT'L L. 439, 445 (Supp. 1935). The universality and passive 
personality principles
do not, however, affect trade problems as do the three principles mentioned 
in the text.
7Ibid.
8 See RESTATEMENT, FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 32,
comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958); Haight, International 
Law and Extraterri-
torial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 
(1954).
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country are required to report; ' in six, agreements that have a
domestic restrictive effect must be reported."' Dutch law, an example
of the first group, requires reporting of "regulations of competition" by
owners of enterprises established in the Netherlands, but instructs
the responsible minister to grant exemption to regulations of com-
petition outside the Netherlands." Danish law, an example of the
second group, requires registration of agreements and enterprises that
exert a substantial influence on trade in Denmark.' The jurisdictional
implications of these two reporting standards are different, not only
as to agreements governing exports and imports, but also as to agree-
ments made abroad that restrict the domestic market, agreements made
at home or participated in by domestic enterprises that apply only to
operation outside the country, and agreements governing international
transportation. In some countries the jurisdiction has not been legis-
latively spelled out and no cases have yet arisen to test what is implied.
In some instances, however, the statute seeks information about do-
mestic effects by requirifig information about activities abroad by
foreign firms.
Austrian law explicitly applies to cartel agreements made abroad
to the extent that they are implemented in Austria. 3 The effect is to
require that these agreements be submitted for registration, which may
be denied, and to deny legal validity to nonregistered agreements.
Anyone who tries to implement an agreement before it has been regis-
tered, after registration has been denied, or in a manner other than
has been registered, is subject to penalties.' 4
Norwegian law, which requires that agreements and associations
be registered if they regulate production or distribution within the
realm, provides that if participants are domiciled abroad, their repre-
sentatives in Norway must report. It also requires that any subsidiary
or person subject to the controlling influence of a foreign firm or
group of firms must be registered if that firm or group has substantial
9 See, e.g., Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 6(1),
2 EUROPEAN PRODUCTIVITY AGENCY OF THE ORGANISATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES UK12,
at 4 (1960) [hereinafter cited as OEEC GUIDE].
10 See, e.g., Cartel Law of 1959, art. 2, 3 OEEC GUIDE A1.0, at 1 (Aust.) ; Act
Against Restraints of Competition of July 27, 1957, § 98(2), 1 0EEC GumE D1.0,
at 41 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
11 Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, as amended by Act of July 16,
1958, §§ 2, 4, 2 0EEC GUIDE NL1.0, at 1-2 (Neth.).
12 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Control Act of March 31, 1955, pt. 3,
1 OEEC GUIDE DK1.0, at 2 (Den.).
13 Cartel Law of 1959, art. 2, 3 OEEC GUIDE A1.0, at 2 (Aust.).
14 Cartel Law of 1959, arts. 3, 5, 38, 39, 3 0EEC GUIDE A1.0, at 2-3, 18-19
(Aust.).
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influence over prices in any foreign country.15 Similarly, Denmark re-
quires that agreements and trade association decisions by which foreign
firms influence the Danish market be reported by the Danish repre-
sentatives of the participants.'"
New Zealand, until registration was ended by amendment of the
law, required that agreements relating to sale or supply in New Zea-
land be registered if one participant carried on business there.'7 The
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of the United Kingdom requires the
registration of restrictive agreements if two or more parties have
thereby accepted restriction and if two or more of the parties do busi-
ness in the United Kingdom; 's but since those who accept the re-
striction need not be those who are domestically domiciled, the effect is
to require that agreements be registered when the only restrictions rele-
vant to the British market apply to the activities of firms not doing
business therein.
In a few instances there is a limited statutory provision for cor-
rective action in cases such as these. New Zealand provides that when
any party to an agreement does not carry on business within the
country, an order may be made with respect to that part of the agree-
ment being carried on in New Zealand.'" This seems to mean that an
enterprise in New Zealand may be ordered not to execute its part of an
agreement made abroad with a foreign enterprise, even though, in the
absence of the agreement, the same acts would be lawful.
Norway forbids Norwegian firms from participating in horizontal
price-fixing arrangements made by foreign firms for sales in NorwayP
It also prohibits representatives of foreign firms from trying to in-
fluence the prices, profits, or discounts of Norwegian firms, and from
trying to induce them to'restrict their competition in bidding.21 More-
over, since the King has the power to forbid restrictions by enterprises
and groups that are required to report, he appears to have general
corrective authority over any registered foreign agreements affecting
the Norwegian market and over any enterprises registered because
they are under foreign control.
15 Act on Control of Prices, Dividends, and Restrictive Business Arrangements
of June 26, 1953, as amended by Acts of June 25, 1954 and March 28, 1958, §§ 33-34,
2 OEEC GumE N1.0, at 24-26 (Nor.).
16 Ministerial Order No. 193 of June 18, 1955, 1 QEEC Gum D1.0.0, at 1 (Den.).
IT Trade Practices Act, Act No. 110 of 1958, § 11(2) (N.Z.).
18 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 6, 2 QEEC GuiDE
UK1.2, at 4.
19 Trade Practices Act, Act No. 110 of 1958, § 19(5) (N.Z.).
2
0 Royal Decree of July 1, 1960 § 1, 2 OEEC GuIDE N3., at 14 (Nor.).
21 Royal Decree of July 1, 1960 § 4, 2 QEEC GuDE N3., at 15 (Nor.).
= Act on Control of Prices, Dividends, and Restrictive Business Arrangements
of June 26, 1953, as amended by Acts of June 25, 1954, March 28, 1958, and June 17,
1960, § 42, 2 OEEC GuiDE N1.0, at 43 (Nor.).
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Efforts to exercise control in foreign markets are also evident in
a few laws. Under the British Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
(Inquiry and Control) Act, statutory orders may govern conduct in
other countries, but only if the persons to whom they apply are British
subjects, British corporations, or persons who carry on business in the
United Kingdom.' Under Norwegian law, restrictions applied in
other countries by Norwegian associations and enterprises are super-
vised, "with a view to counteracting conditions which may have a
detrimental effect on Norwegian interests .... ,, 24 New Zealand's
registration requirement covered restrictive agreements, regardless of
the locus of the trade affected, if two or more of the parties carried on
business in New Zealand. 5 Thus it appears to have been applicable
to agreements among New Zealand enterprises about operations abroad.
Within the Common Market national authority has been scram-
bled in a new way. As I understand the Treaty of Rome " in
the light of the recently issued regulations, the provisions related to
business restrictions are municipal law in every member state. If
agreements and activities by dominant firms offend the substantive
standards of the treaty, and the international commission has not acted,
each member country is obligated to curb these agreements or activi-
ties, whether the prohibited effects appear in its domestic market or
only in the markets of other member countries. The impending en-
largement of the Common Market makes it probable that this kind
of obligation will become the norm among most of the trading nations
of Western Europe.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a world characterized by supranational corporations, inter-
national cartels, and dependence of many countries upon other coun-
tries for supplies or markets, a strictly territorial basis for national
jurisdiction is unrealistic. Whatever its place in tradition, it does not
accord with the facts of a world of increasingly interdependent states.
A restriction applied in Country A that reaches across a national
boundary to impair the trade of Country B is no less an interference
with another country's affairs than is an effort by Country B to reach
across the border into Country A to find out what is being done and,
23 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act,. 1948, 11 &
12 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 10(4), 2 OEEC GUIDE UK1.0, at 11.
2 4 Act on Control of Prices, Dividends, and Restrictive Business Arrangements
of June 26, 1953, as amended by Acts of June 25, 1954 and March 28, 1958, § 43,
2 0EEC GuIDE N1.0, at 31 (Nor.).
2 5 Trade Practices Act, Act No. 110 of 1958, § 11(1) (N.Z.).
26 Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, pt 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 88, 298 U.N.T.S. 49.
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if possible, to stop it. International trade is the proper concern of all
who participate; hence overlapping claims of jurisdiction are appro-
priate expressions of the underlying facts.
Insofar as individual countries tolerate schemes that restrict
foreign trade, the overlap becomes more important; for such restric-
tions typically hurt interests in other countries. Only by repressing
such restrictions can one nation avoid the extraterritorial injury that
evokes extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction.
To assert this duality of interests is, of course, to say that control
of international trade ought to be entrusted to international agencies
or, if carried on nationally, ought to be coordinated. It is to recognize
the awkwardness and insufficiency of any national claim to exclusive
jurisdiction. It implies a great need to seek ways of minimizing con-
flicts among governmental policies. But these ways cannot be found if
one begins by denying the legitimacy of some of the affected interests
or by insisting that jurisdiction belongs @s a matter of right to govern-
ments that represent only one side of the market bargain.
When the issues that arise involve direct and simple conflicts of
interest, conflicting claims of jurisdiction are inevitable. But as par-
ticipation in international trade by each country comes to be broader
and more diverse, the national interest no longer can be defined as a
simple expression of the interest of consumers or producers nor as a
simple expression of a desire to control foreign corporate interests or to
protect domestic corporate interests. Each country finds itself on both
sides of the market and on both sides of the problem of controlling
corporate power, and therefore is increasingly likely to recognize the
validity of the interests of both sides.
Acceptance of the view that the buyer's interest is valid and should
be protected is inherent in the Common Market's action in pooling the
authority of members to cope with cartels in international trade. The
example of the Common Market increases the incentive and the oppor-
tunity for the Atlantic Community, or perhaps a more inclusive group,
to do likewise. But even before such a degree of cooperation is realized,
international conferences may evolve more viable interim concepts by
which the claim of consumers to reasonable protection and the claim
of governments not to have their reasonable interests disregarded by
resort to control havens are better reconciled with the claim of business
not tQ be subjected to conflicting orders and the claim of each govern-
ment to retain authority within its own territory and over its own
citizens.
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